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Recent Decisions
FAMILY LAW - NONCUSTODIAL POST-SECONDARY EDUCATIONAL
SUPPORT - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a Penn-
sylvania statute allowing courts to order noncustodial parents to
contribute to the post-secondary education of their children in
the absence of an express agreement by the parents to contribute
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995).
In 1993, the Pennsylvania legislature passed Act 62,' which
permitted courts to order parents in non-intact families to con-
tribute to their children's post-secondary educational expenses.
2
The legislature enacted Act 62 in response to a decision by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to not recognize a parental duty to
provide such educational support.3 In passing Act 62, the legisla-
1. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4327 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
2. Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 267 (Pa. 1995). Act 62 provided that "a court
may order either or both parents who are separated, divorced, unmarried or otherwise
subject to an existing support obligation to provide equitably for educational costs of their
child whether an application for this support is made before or after the child has reached
18 years of age." 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4327(a) (1994 & 1995 Supp.). A non-intact family
is one in which the parents are separated, divorced, unmarried or otherwise subject to an
existing support obligation. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 269-70. Act 62 defines "post-secondary
education" as '[an educational or vocational program provided at a college, university or
other post-secondary vocational, secretarial, business or technical school." 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 4327(j) (1994 & 1995 Supp.).
3. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 267. In Blue v. Blue, 616 A.2d 628 (Pa. 1992), the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that neither case law nor statutory law imposed a duty on
parents to provide support for the post-secondary education of their children. Blue, 616
A.2d at 631. The court noted that it had enforced specific agreements to provide such
support, but that it never declared a legal obligation to pay post-secondary education to
exist in absence of an agreement. Id. See discussion of Blue infra at notes 66-73 and in
the accompanying text. See also Emrick v. Emrick, 284 A.2d 682 (Pa. 1971)(holding that
noncustodial parent's freely bargained agreement to pay for college expenses of child is
enforceable), discussed infra at notes 40-44 and in the accompanying text.
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ture declared that it had "a rational and legitimate interest" in
requiring this form of parental support.4
On March 2, 1993, Phillip H. Kline ("Mr. Kline") filed a peti-
tion in the common pleas court of Chester county, Pennsylvania,
to terminate the support order against him for two of his three
children.5 Both children were over eighteen and attending col-
lege.6 Mr. Kline alleged within the petition that Act 62 denied
him equal protection under the law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.7
The court held that Act 62 was indeed violative of the Equal
Protection Clause.' Determining that Act 62 did not involve a
fundamental right,9 suspect classification, 10 "important" right"
4. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 269. The preamble to Act 62 explicitly states that the Gen-
eral Assembly's purpose was to codify previous lower court decisions that had developed a
noncustodial parental duty to contribute to a child's post-secondary educational expenses.
No. 1993-62, 1993 Pa. Laws 431. Specifically, the legislature sought to adopt the reason-
ing of the superior court in Ulmer v. Sommerville, 190 A.2d 182 (Pa. 1963), discussed
infra at notes 34-39 and in the accompanying text. Id.
5. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 267.
6. Curtis v. Kline, 42 Ches. Co. Rep. 147, 148 (1994). One child attended West
Chester University and the other attended Kutztown University. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 267.
7. Curtis, 42 Ches. Co. Rep. at 148. The common pleas court subsequently noti-
fied the Attorney General that the constitutionality of an Act of Assembly had been chal-
lenged. Id. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 235 provides that the Attorney General
must be notified of any action alleging an Act of Assembly to be unconstitutional. PA. R.
Civ. P. 235. The rule allows the Attorney General to intervene in the action or otherwise
be heard without intervention. See id. John G. Knorr, Chief Deputy Attorney General of
Pennsylvania, indicated that the Attorney General's office would not pursue an appeal
after the trial court's decision in Curtis. Julia Malloy-Good & Kathleen B. Vetrano, Edu-
cational Support Statute Unconstitutional; Divorced and Intact Families Treated Differ-
ently Under Blue, PA. L. J., Feb. 14, 1994, at 5.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
8. Curtis, 42 Ches. Co. Rep at 150. The trial court analyzed the three classifica-
tions and three standards of review used to review an equal protection challenge. Id. at
149. The three classifications are those involving suspect classes and fundamental rights,
important but not fundamental rights and sensitive classifications and all other classifi-
cations. Id. The three standards of review are strict scrutiny intermediate or heightened
scrutiny and the rational basis standard. Id. The court noted that classifications not
dealing with suspect classes or fundamental rights only have to meet a rational basis test.
Id. The court then stated that classifications involving suspect classes or fundamental
rights invoke strict scrutiny. Id. The court concluded by noting that the intermediate or
heightened standard of review would be employed where "important" rights are involved
or where a "sensitive" classification has been made. Id. See also San Antonio Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)(holding that funding of elementary and secondary public
education is not fundamental right invoking strict scrutiny); Singer v. Sheppard, 346
A.2d 897 (Pa. 1975Xholding that classifications not involving suspect classifications or
fundamental rights must be reasonable and relate to legitimate legislative objective).
9. A fundamental right is one explicitly or implicitly found in the Constitution
and invokes strict scrutiny. James v. Southeastern Pa. Transit Auth., 477 A.2d 1302,
1306 (Pa. 1984) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.15 (1982)). Strict scrutiny
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or sensitive classification, 12 the court found that the proper con-
stitutional inquiry was whether the statute's classification was
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.13 The court then
analyzed the legislative history of Act 62 in order to determine
its purpose, which revealed that there were three motivations for
Act 62: the need for quick action because fall tuition bills were
due, the possibility that some parents would be compelled to liq-
uidate real estate assets to make educational support payments
and the inequity of treating parents differently due to marital
status. 14
The court reasoned that no rational purpose existed for the
legislature to conclude that parents in intact families should be
permitted to deny their children a college education while a simi-
lar decision by parents in a non-intact family must be court
approved.'" Subsequently, the court granted Mr. Kline's petition
to terminate his support order. 6
demands that a state show that the classification has been narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling state interest. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217.
10. Classifications based on race, alienage or religion are "inherently" suspect.
Martin v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 466 A.2d 107, 112 (Pa. 1983).
11. Important rights have been defined as liberty interests or essential benefits
withheld from an individual. James, 477 A.2d at 1306 (citing LAURENCE TRIBE, AmERICAN
CONsTrrTIoNAL LAw §§ 16-31 (1978)). A liberty interest has been affected when, for
example, an individual's access to the courts is restricted. James, 477 A.2d at 1306.
12. Classifications based on paternity are considered to be sensitive. James, 477
A.2d at 1306 (citing Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978)). Gender is also deemed to be a
sensitive classification. See United States v. VMI, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996)(holding that
any gender based classification warrants heightened scrutiny).
13. Curtis, 42 Ches. Co. Rep. at 149-50. The court first stated that a classification
of parents and students is not suspect. Id. The court then noted that the case did not
involve fundamental rights and that neither a sensitive classification nor the burdening
of important rights had been alleged. Id. The test applied by the court is known as the
rational basis test. Id. at 150 (citing Mowery v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co.,
535 A.2d 658 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that rational basis test is appropriate where
statute denies first part economic benefits as result of owning uninsured vehicle). For a
discussion of the rational basis test, see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (holding
that classifications lacking "invidious discrimination" do not offend equal protection
clause), and Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (holding that classi-
fication made based on reasonable legislative judgment is not denial of equal protection).
14. Id. See also LEGISLATIvE J. OF PA. - HOUSE 1686-89 (1993). The court also took
judicial notice of the hundreds of property settlements in which non-intact families devel-
oped their own method of allocating for their children's post-secondary educational
expenses. Curtis, 42 Ches. Co. Rep. at 152.
15. Curtis, 42 Ches. Co. Rep. at 152, 153. The court was not convinced that par-
ents who made joint decisions about their children's education prior to divorce should be
prevented from doing so merely due to the divorce. Id. at 152. The court was also con-
cerned that judicial judgment would be substituted for parental judgment. Id. The court
hypothesized that the married parents of an eighteen year old who refused to pay for
college could be compelled to do so if they subsequently separated, and such an anomaly
was clearly unjustified. Id. at 153. Accordingly, the court concluded that Act 62 irration-
ally classified students based on the marital status of the parents. Id. at 154.
16. Id. at 154.
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The trial court granted the Department of Public Welfare
("DPW") leave to intervene in the case.17 DPW then appealed the
trial court's decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.'8 On
appeal, the supreme court affirmed the decision to invalidate Act
62.19
A majority of the court found that the legislature had classified
children in need of post-minority educational support into two
groups: children in intact families and children in non-intact
families. 20 Since the court found no independent right to post-
secondary education to exist under either the Pennsylvania or
U.S. Constitution, it asserted that there was no rational reason
for children in non-intact families to be permitted to compel
parental support for post-minority education when children in
intact families had no similar legal right.21 The majority rejected
the argument that children in non-intact families needed such a
right on the basis that no such right was constitutionally guaran-
teed.22 The court was also unpersuaded by a New Hampshire
Supreme Court decision upholding a state statute permitting
court ordered post-secondary support.23
Justice Montemuro, joined by Justice Cappy, dissented from
the majority based on his disagreement with the way the major-
17. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 267. Intervention is the imposition of a third party who is
not a party to the original suit into the claim to protect his or her interest. BLAcK's LAw
DIcrxoNARY 820 (6th ed. 1990). The DPW is permitted to appeal actions that present a
question of law or of public interest. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4534(A) (1995). Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure permit intervention when the determination of an action will
effect a legally enforceable interest. See PA. R. Civ. P. 2327(4).
18. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 267. See also Malloy-Good & Vetrano, supra note 7.
Appeals from actions in which a court of common pleas has found any Pennsylvania law
unconstitutional are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 722(7) (1995).
19. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 265. Four justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
voted to affirm the decision and two justices dissented. Id. at 265, 267.
20. Id. at 269, 270. The majority had first determined that neither strict nor
heightened scrutiny was appropriate and then applied the rational basis test. Id. at 268.
The court found that the classification was based on the marital status of the parents. Id.
at 269.
21. Id. at 268-69.
22. Id. at 269-70.
23. Id. at 270 (citing LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350 (N.H. 1993)). In LeClair,
the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the classification of married parents and
divorced parents was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of ensuring that
children in divorced families receive post-secondary educational opportunities equal to
those afforded to children in married families. LeClair, 624 A.2d at 1357. See also
Childers v. Childers, 577 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1978)(holding that court ordered noncustodial
support past majority does not violate equal protection); Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376
N.E.2d 1382 (Ill. 1978)(holding that statute allowing court to order support for post-sec-
ondary educational expenses passes rational basis test); Neudecker v. Neudecker, 577
N.E.2d 960 (Ind. 1991Xholding statute allowing post-secondary support from custodial or
noncustodial parent, or both, to be constitutional).
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ity applied the rational basis test to Act 62.24 Specifically, Jus-
tice Montemuro found that the frequent unwillingness of
noncustodial parents to comply with support obligations pro-
vided a legitimate state reason for the legislature to accord chil-
dren of non-intact families with access to legal enforcement
methods for post-minority educational support.25 Justice
Montemuro recited the factors provided in Act 62 that a court
must consider prior to ordering support as evidence that the stat-
ute was not mandatory so much as it was permissive and equita-
ble.26 In conclusion, Justice Montemuro stated that the
majority's disregard for the legislature's stated purpose in enact-
ing Act 62 "transforms [the] Court into a super-Legislature."27
Act 62 was the Pennsylvania legislature's first attempt to
impose a duty on parents in non-intact families to pay post-
minority educational support for their children.2 Prior to Act 62,
however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had tacitly allowed
Pennsylvania courts to create and refine such a duty.29
In the 1929 case of Commonwealth v. Gilmore,3° the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court addressed the issue of whether a sup-
port order against a noncustodial parent could be terminated
with respect to a child who reached the age of sixteen, the age at
24. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 270-71 (Montemuro, J., dissenting). Justice Montemuro
stated the rational basis test as having a two tiered analysis. Id. at 271. Under the first
tier, the statute must be in response to a "legitimate state interest." Id. Under the sec-
ond tier, the statute must be reasonably related to the state interest. Id. (citing Common-
wealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d 1358 (Pa. 1986)(holding that statute which
allows flexibility in assessing penalties is rationally related where classification flows
from stated purpose of the statute)).
25. Id. at 271. Justice Montemuro supported his contention by citing two reports
to Congress regarding child support enforcement. Id. at 271 nn.1-2. The first report
noted that Pennsylvania spent more than one hundred million dollars to enforce collec-
tion of over eight hundred million dollars in child support. Id. at 271 n.1 (citing Ranking
of Region III States Child Support Enforcement, Fiscal Year 1994). The second report
noted that in 1993, only two-thirds of all child support due was paid, and only half of the
population. received the entire amount due. Id. at 271 n.2 (citing Child Support Enforce-
ment, Eighteenth Annual Report to Congress).
26. Id. at 273. Section 4327(e) of Act 62 provides that the "court shall consider all
relevant factors" including the financial resources of the parents and student, financial
aid received by the student, the general willingness of the student to complete the studies
and to contribute to the cost of the education and any other relevant factors. 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 4327(e) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
27. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 274. Justice Montemuro declared that the majority opinion
ignores the inherent monetary disadvantage suffered by children in non-intact families.
Id. Justice Montemuro also lamented the fact that these children, after suffering the
repercussions of the divorce, suffer again by the denial of support, and that the majority
opinion renders the courts powerless to assist. Id.
28. Id. at 267.
29. See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case Blue v.
Blue, 616 A.2d 628 (Pa. 1992).
30. 97 Pa. Super. 303 (1929).
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which state law did not mandate further school attendance."1
The court held that the order could not be terminated, finding
that the law imposed a duty on noncustodial parents to provide
education as well as maintenance to their children.2 Alluding to
prior decisions allowing continued support for children under six-
teen who were capable of supporting themselves, the court held
that when any child, even over the age of sixteen, is willing to
continue his or her education and the noncustodial parent can
support that child, support payments shall continue.3
In the later case of Ulmer v. Sommerville,34 the Pennsylvania
Superior Court addressed the similar issue of whether a noncus-
todial father could be compelled to contribute to his daughter's
post-secondary education.35 The court determined that in the
absence of an express agreement by the noncustodial parent to
provide such support, two conditions must be met prior to requir-
ing payment for the education.36
31. Gilmore, 97 Pa. Super. at 304. The defendant father was subject to a five dollar
per week support agreement. Id. The father sought to terminate the support when the
son reached age sixteen. Id. The trial court terminated the support order and the supe-
rior court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. Id. The trial court held a
rehearing and subsequently dismissed the father's petition to terminate the support
order. Id. at 304, 305, 313. The superior court adopted the opinion of the trial court. Id.
at 303, 313.
32. Id. at 307. The court cited Pennsylvania precedent to support the contention
that a general duty exists for noncustodial parents to provide some education to their
children. See In re Harland's Accounts, 5 Rawle 323 (Pa. 1835) (finding that settlement of
trust cannot include father's educational expenses); Filter v. Filter, 33 Pa. 50 (1859)(hold-
ing that parents should be bound to provide reasonable education and support expenses).
33. Gilmore, 97 Pa. Super. at 311-13. The court stated that the child's intent to
receive the education must be genuine. Id. at 312. While the court noted that the pur-
pose of the requirement to provide the education is to ensure a highly educated populace,
the support would apparently end after high school. Id. The court acknowledged that in
a rare or deserving case, post-secondary support may be justified. Id. at 309 (citing Pea-
cock v. Linton, 47 A. 887 (R.I. 1901).
34. 190 A.2d 182 (Pa. 1963).
35. ULmer, 190 A.2d at 183. Elaine Ulmer and John Sommerville had divorced and
Mr. Sommerville had agreed to pay forty dollars per week for the support of his daugh-
ters, Joyce and Molly Lynn. Id. The daughters lived with Mrs. Sommerville, who remar-
ried after the divorce. Id. The trial court denied Mr. Sommerville's petition to terminate
his support payments. Id. Mr. Sommerville appealed the denial as to the twenty dollars
per week support for his daughter attending college. Id.
36. Id. The court cited precedent supporting agreements to pay for college
expenses. Id. See Stomel v. Stomel, 119 A.2d 597 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956)(holding that
father's statement in open court that he would support child constitutes agreement to pay
for college expenses); Grossman v. Grossman, 146 A.2d 315 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958)(holding
that father who stated that he would have liked to have son attend college absent divorce
agreed to contribute to college expenses); Howell v. Howell, 181 A.2d 903 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1962)(holding that educational endowment policy constitutes agreement to pay for college
expenses). The court also cited previous decisions that left open the possibility of court
imposed payments in the absence of an agreement. Id. at 183-84. The court cited as
authority Gillen v. Gillen, 156 A. 572 (Pa. 1931)(noting that support is not justified where
children are near age of twenty-one), Binney v. Binney, 22 A.2d 303 (Pa. 1941)(finding
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First, there must be proof that the child is willing and able to
complete the college education.37 Second, the noncustodial par-
ent must have sufficient resources to pay for the education with-
out enduring undue hardship or sacrifice.38 In this case, the
court found that the custodial mother had greater resources than
the noncustodial father, and therefore held that the post-secon-
dary educational support order against the father was not
justified.39
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was faced with the issue of
whether a noncustodial father could reduce his support pay-
ments when two of his five children reached the age of twenty-
one in the case of Emrick v. Emrick. ° The court in Emrick
approved the rule that noncustodial parents had no duty to pay
for the educational expenses of their children unless the pay-
ments could be made without "undue hardship."41 The court rea-
soned that varying family circumstances led to the superior
court's flexible approach to post-secondary support.42 Noting
that the parties in this case had stipulated to the father's pay-
ment of his children's post-secondary education, however, the
court concluded that the father was bound by the agreement.43
The court also held the father responsible for the payment
because he demonstrated the ability to pay at least some of the
post-secondary educational expenses."
support for college unjustified where noncustodial income is in flux), and Commonwealth
v. Wingert 98 A.2d 203 (Pa. 1953)(holding that support for college should not be compelled
where college is merely a "finishing" school).
37. U/mer, 190 A.2d at 184.
38. Id. The court noted that sacrifice is required to provide the necessities of life,
but such an "exacting requirement" cannot be required in order to pay for college
expenses. Id.
39. Id. The court cautioned against using the custodial parent's available
resources as the only criteria. Id. The court cited the following other factors as useful in
its decision to deny support: the mother had remarried, the children had access to a trust
fund and the father's income had not materially increased since the divorce. Id. at 184-
85.
40. 284 A.2d 682 (Pa. 1971). The mother and father had divorced and the divorce
agreement stipulated that the father would pay seventy dollars per month per minor
child. Id. The divorce decree also stipulated that the father would provide a college edu-
cation for each child. Id. at 682-83. After two of his five children reached the age of
twenty-one, the father refused to pay for their educational expenses. Id. at 683.
41. Emrick, 284 A.2d at 683. The court cited three factors to be considered in
determining undue hardship: size of the estate, amount of income and possible income.
Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. The court commented that the father could at least contribute a portion
and at the most provide for the entire education. Id. The court noted that the father's
resources increased by reason of the decrease in the support obligation to the minor chil-
dren. Id.
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In the 1979 case of Brake v. Brake, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania was asked to determine whether a support order
against a noncustodial parent for a post-minority child should be
reduced when the child earns enough money to pay for incidental
college expenses.4 6 Recognizing that a support order for a child's
college education could be granted as long as no "undue hard-
ship" resulted to the parent,47 the court found that such support
orders could be modified only where the facts demonstrated a
permanent change in the noncustodial parent's circumstances.48
As the father in this case had not demonstrated a sufficient
material change in circumstances, the court found a reduction of
the support order unwarranted.4 9
The Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the issue of
whether a noncustodial father's support payments should be lim-
ited to his post-minority child's college tuition in Lederer v. Led-
erer.10 The mother in this case had appealed from a trial court
decision ordering the father to pay six hundred dollars per year
toward his daughter's college tuition.5' The superior court
acknowledged that according to the law of Pennsylvania, a non-
custodial father could be compelled to pay for his child's post-
secondary education as long as such payment resulted in the
father enduring no "undue hardship."52 The court stated that the
test for determining the proper amount of support must take into
45. 413 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1979).
46. Brake, 413 A.2d at 423-24. The daughter attending college sought support only
for "incidental expenses" because vocational rehabilitation paid for her tuition, fees, room
and board. Id. at 423. Originally, the trial court ordered the father to pay one hundred
and fifty dollars per month toward these expenses. Id. After a hearing, the trial court
reduced the payments to forty dollars per month and the daughter appealed. Id.
47. Id. (citing Ulmer v. Sommerville, 190 A.2d 182 (Pa. 1963)).
48. Id. The court cited as authority Bell v. Bell, 323 A.2d 267, 269 (Pa. 1974) (hold-
ing that support orders can be increased or decreased so long as circumstances warrant-
ing change are permanent and material). Id. The court then reviewed the father's
petition to modify to determine if there were sufficiently changed circumstances. Id.
49. Id. The court found the fact that the daughter worked for one month during
one summer to be insufficient with respect to showing that she could pay for her inciden-
tal expenses. Id.
50. 435 A.2d 199 (Pa. 1981). The parents' divorce decree granted custody of their
three children to the mother. Id. at 199. The father paid support for all three children
until the oldest child, Claire, turned eighteen. Id. The father then petitioned the trial
court to end the support for Claire. Id. The trial court ended the support but ordered the
father to pay part of Claire's tuition costs. Id. The trial court commented that Claire
would be required to pay for her own supplemental expenses. Id.
51. Lederer, 435 A.2d at 199. The father consented only to paying for tuition. Id.
The trial court mandated that the six hundred dollar payments increase along with any
tuition increases. Id.
52. Id. at 200-01. The court cited as authority Emrick v. Emrick, 284 A.2d 682 (Pa.
1971). See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of Emrick.
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consideration any resources of the student. 3 The court then
expanded the definition of post-secondary educational expenses
to include other miscellaneous expenses besides tuition.54 In con-
clusion, the court remanded the case to the trial court with
instructions not to apply the undue hardship test to the case
until those other expenses had been ascertained and
considered.
55
In Leonard v. Leonard, 56 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
expanded the concept of "undue hardship" by considering a non-
custodial father's potential earnings, as compared to actual earn-
ings, when determining the amount of support he should pay for
his daughter's post-secondary education.57 The court first deter-
mined that the daughter was justified in seeking support from
the noncustodial parent58 and then expanded the usual "undue
hardship" examination by focusing on the noncustodial parent's
potential income. 59 The court concluded that the noncustodial
father's voluntary reduction of his income combined with his
53. Lederer, 435 A.2d at 201. The court held that the test to determine the proper
amount of support must consider the following factors: whether the child was willing and
able to successfully complete the education, the availability of the child's own resources
and whether the support payments would impose "undue hardship." Id.
54. Id. The court characterized the other expenses as those that were a necessary
part of the college experience. Id.
55. Id. The court focused on the lack of information concerning whether the pay-
ment of the additional educational expenses would be an undue burden on the father in
its decision to remand. Id.
56. 510 A.2d 827 (Pa. 1986).
57. Leonard, 510 A.2d at 828, 831. The parents had married in 1974, and the
father adopted the mother's two children from a prior marriage. Id. The parents
divorced in 1984 and the mother received custody of the children. Id. The daughter
attended Ursinis College as a freshman in 1985 and planned to return as a sophomore in
1986. Id. at 828. The trial court had ordered, pursuant to the parent's settlement agree-
ment, the father to contribute to past and future educational expenses of the daughter.
Id. The father had worked for Delaware & Hudson, but was on voluntary furlough. Id.
The father's actual income was minimal, but the court stated that the father could be
making approximately thirty thousand dollars per year had he not volunteered for fur-
lough. Id. at 831.
58. Id. The court found that the daughter was making progress in college and
intended to continue her education. Id. The court noted that the daughter sought and
received financial aid, both need-based and non-need based. Id. The daughter's grade
point average was an 80.68 out of 100 and she planned to take summer classes. Id.
59. Id. at 830. The court found that the father's reduction in income due to being
on furlough was purely voluntary. Id. The court noted that the father's "negative"
income from his rental holdings was largely due to depreciation. Id. The court also
looked at the father's actual cash-flow, rather than taxable income, to determine his abil-
ity to contribute to his daughter's education. Id. at 831 (citing Hagerty v. Eyster, 429
A.2d 665, 668-69 (Pa. 1981) (holding that when there is discrepancy between actual earn-
ings and potential earnings, court should consider both in determining support)).
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income from rental properties permitted the court to compel him
to contribute to his daughter's education. 60
In the 1989 case of Milne v. Milne,6 the Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court considered whether a son, who was willfully estranged
from his noncustodial mother, could compel her to contribute to
his post-secondary education.62 Finding that it had flexibility in
awarding post-secondary educational support to children in non-
intact families, 63 the court held that it must consider extraneous
circumstances such as willful estrangement before awarding
such support. 64 The court determined that in this case the son's
behavior exceeded mere estrangement, and thus he was not enti-
tled to post-minority educational support from his noncustodial
mother. 5
60. Id. at 831. The court also looked to the father's assets and concluded that his
additional income was extensive. Id. The father had argued that the custodial mother
did not support the daughter. Id. The court disagreed, noting that the mother provided
the daughter with transportation to and from college as well as money for incidental
expenses. Id. In a concurring opinion, Judge Kelly added that the father's responsibility
to contribute was not relieved by the fact that the daughter received financial aid in order
to meet her educational expenses. Id. at 831-32 (Kelly, J., concurring). Judge Kelly
stated that the receipt of financial aid did not abrogate the parent's "primary" responsibil-
ity for the educational expenses, and held that the court must not permit parents to use
limited financial aid resources to avoid their responsibilities. Id. at 832.
61. 556 A.2d 854 (Pa. 1989).
62. Milne, 556 A.2d at 856. The noncustodial mother had appealed from the trial
court's award of $3,250 in educational support for her son. Id. at 855. The son's estrange-
ment was the result of several violent arguments. Id. The custodial father encouraged
the son to seek post-secondary educational expenses from his mother after the son
decided to transfer to a more expensive college. Id.
63. Id. at 857. The court cited as authority Ulmer v. Sommerville, 190 A.2d 182
(Pa. 1963). See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ulmer. The
court then cited additional authority to support its proposition that the Ulmer rule had
been expanded. Id. at 858. See Sutliffv. Sutliff, 528 A.2d 1318, 1322 (Pa. 1987)(holding
that trust funds may not be used by court to reduce parent's support obligation); Chesonis
v. Chesonis, 538 A.2d 1376 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)(holding that court may consider stu-
dent's income in determining whether parental contribution would constitute undue
hardship); Francis v. Francis, 517 A.2d 997 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)(finding that parent may
be ordered to contribute to private education if such education is consistent with family's
status prior to separation).
64. Milne, 556 A.2d at 859. The court reasoned that imposing responsibilities on
the children, as well as' the noncustodial parent, allowed for a more balanced approach
and further justified the court's heightened role in family decisions. Id. at 859-60. The
court compared the approach of neighboring jurisdictions in solving this problem. Id. at
862-63 (citing Riegler v. Reigler, 532 S.W.2d 734 (Ark. 1976)(holding that father was not
obligated to pay for college when father was not consulted about choice of college); Ham-
brick v. Prestwood, 382 So.2d 474 (Miss. 1980)(holding that where daughter refused to
visit or have contact with father, father was not obligated to pay for daughter's college
expenses); Cohen v. Schnepf, 454 N.Y.S.2d 785 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982)(holding that college
payments made by noncustodial father may be stopped where son broke all contact with
father)).
65. Id. at 866. The son and mother had engaged in several violent arguments. Id.
at 865. During one argument, the son spit in the mother's face. Id. The court concluded
that the son's acts of leaving and physically threatening his mother constituted "adult
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In the recent landmark case of Blue v. Blue ,66 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a non-
custodial parent could be compelled to contribute to his or her
child's college education in the absence of an agreement to do
so. 6 7  In Blue, the noncustodial father had been ordered to con-
tribute to his son's college education by the trial court.8 The
superior court affirmed the trial court's support order but
reversed its allowance of the son's financial aid to be offset from
the parental support. 9
On appeal, the supreme court commenced its decision by dis-
tinguishing the previous cases in this area from the Blue case on
the ground that such cases involved the enforcement of agree-
ments between divorced parents to pay for their children's educa-
tional expenses while this case did not.7 0 The court stated that
while the previous cases had assumed a legal duty to exist for
actions." Id. at 866. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering
support under these facts. Id. In a dissenting opinion, Judge McEwen argued that even
willful estrangement should not prevent the award of post-secondary support. Id. at 867
(McEwen, J., dissenting). Judge McEwen found that the son was willing and able to con-
tinue his education and that the mother could afford to partially reimburse the custodial
father for the educational costs. Id. Judge McEwen argued that the trial court's strict
adherence to the U/mer test did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. at 868. Judge
McEwen further stated that expanding the Ulmer test was both bad public policy and
analogous to using a fault analysis. Id. at 869.
66. 616 A.2d 628 (Pa. 1992).
67. Blue, 616 A.2d at 629. The son had completed three semesters at Penn State
University, but stopped attending college after his parents separated in 1987. Id. Both
the noncustodial father and custodial mother worked at Lehigh County Community Col-
lege. Id. The parents had paid the college expenses jointly before the separation and had
not required the son to apply for financial aid. Id. The father presented evidence that
both he and the mother had accumulated sufficient savings to pay for the son's post-sec-
ondary education. Id.
68. Id. at 630. The trial court ordered the noncustodial father to pay forty-six hun-
dred dollars per year for the student's education. Id. The trial court also required the
student to apply for financial aid. Id. The trial court ordered that the father's contribu-
tion be reduced by the amount of any financial aid received. Id.
69. Id. The superior court reasoned that the parent's obligation to pay for college
expenses was not dependent upon the financial aid that the child received. Id. The supe-
rior court noted that the parents bear the primary burden of paying college expenses, and
any financial aid received should not reduce that burden. Id.
70. Id. at 631-32. The court stated that it had not "unequivocally adopt[ed]" the
Ulmer rule in Emrick. Id. at 631. The court then reviewed Leonard v. Leonard, 510 A.2d
827 (Pa. 1986), discussed supra at notes 56-60 and in the accompanying text; Brake v.
Brake, 413 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1979), discussed supra at notes 45-49 and in the accompanying
text; Lederer v. Lederer, discussed supra at notes 50-55 and in the accompanying text;
Ulmer v. Sommerville, 190 A.2d 182 (Pa. 1963), discussed supra at notes 34-39 and in the
accompanying text; Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 97 Pa. Super. 303 (Pa. 1929), discussed
supra at notes 30-33 and in the accompanying text. Id. The court stated that each of the
previous cases sought to enforce a duty that did not exist. Id. at 632. The court disagreed
with the lower court's transformation of a right to a basic education into a right to a
college education. Id. The court concluded that such a right must be created by the legis-
lature rather than the court. Id.
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noncustodial parents who agreed to contribute to their child's col-
lege education to so contribute, 71 in the absence of such agree-
ment neither the judiciary nor the legislature created such a
duty.72 The court then held that in this circumstance, the issue
of post-secondary educational support was best handled by the
legislature.73
Following the Blue decision, acting Governor Mark Singel
signed into law Act 62, allowing for court-ordered post-secondary
support against noncustodial parents.74 Act 62 was the Penn-
sylvania legislature's quick response to Blue and ensured that
children in non-intact families would have adequate time and
ability to pay college tuition bills. 75  Act 62 was colloquially
known as the anti-Blue legislation because the legislature was
very specific in the act to explicitly overrule Blue.76
Following the supreme court's declaration of the unconstitu-
tionality of Act 62 in Curtis v. Kline,77 a number of family law
practitioners expressed displeasure with the ruling.78 The court's
decision that the classification of students based on family status
violated the Equal Protection Clause was both surprising and
discouraging to some in the Pennsylvania legal community, as
the legislature had sought to provide within Act 62 specific crite-
71. Blue, 616 A.2d at 631. The court declared any rule allowing support to be
imposed unless such support causes "undue hardship" to be nothing more than a fiction
since it was not supported by statute or case law. Id. The court stated that agreements
to provide post-secondary support were only binding when entered into freely. Id.
72. Id. at 632. The court found that the superior court misinterpreted the parental
duty to provide for education as allowing a court to order support payments for college.
Id. The court concluded that college was not a necessity within the meaning of Common-
wealth v. Gilmore, 97 Pa. Super. 303 (1929) (discussed supra at notes 31-35 and in the
accompanying text), but rather an enhancement. Id.
73. Id. The court noted the extensive involvement of the legislature in drafting the
divorce and domestic relations statutes in reaching such a decision. Id. In a brief dis-
sent, Justice Larsen stated that the case did not involve an abuse of discretion. Id. at 633
(Larsen, J., dissenting). Justice Larsen also stated that the superior court's reversal of
the financial aid offset resulted in a windfall to the student. Id.
74. No. 1993-62, 1993 Pa. Laws 431. The preamble to Act 62 stated the legisla-
ture's intent to adopt the lower court decisions "prior to the decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Blue v. Blue, 532 Pa. 521, 616 A.2d 628 (1992)." No. 1993-62, 1993 Pa.
Laws 431.
75. See LEGISLATIVE J. OF PA. - HOUSE 1686-89 (1993). The legislature was almost
certainly concerned about the implications of adjourning in June without resolving the
issue. Legislative Legwork; the Good, the Bad and the Ugly of a Capitol All-Nighter, Prrr.
POsT-GAZEMTe, June 25, 1993, at B2.
76. See Dorothy K. Phillips, College Support Varies From County to County: Anti-
Blue Legislation Not Valid in Certain Jurisdictions, LEGAL INTELLIG., Sep. 20, 1994, at 3;
Michael A. Riccardi, Uncertainty Grows As Judges Choose Sides On College Support Law,
PA. LAw WiELy., June 27, 1994, at 1.
77. 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995).
78. See Casey Combs, Court: Divorced parents need not pay for college, Prrr. POST-
GAzETrE, Oct. 12, 1995, at Al.
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ria from which a court could determine whether to order post-
secondary support.79
The Curtis decision indeed may be said to be inconsistent with
Blue since the supreme court clearly concluded in Blue that the
issue of post-secondary support from noncustodial parents was
within the legislature's sole domain.80 In Blue, the court
appeared to indicate that the legislature could choose to adopt
Ulmer and its progeny if it so desired."' In Curtis, however, the
court abruptly disregarded prior deference to the legislature by
asserting that the legislature had no rational reason for conclud-
ing that students in non-intact families needed additional protec-
tion and intervention from the state. 2 As Justice Montemuro
noted in his dissent, however, the current pervasiveness of
unpaid support obligations and the disruptive effects of divorce
strongly suggest that it is the children in non-intact families who
need additional protection from the court.8 3
After Curtis, the crucial question is whether any method
remains in Pennsylvania to compel noncustodial parents to con-
tribute to the post-secondary educational expenses of their chil-
dren. Perhaps the only remaining method to compel such
payments may be an express agreement for the provision of the
payment between the relevant parties. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania approved and upheld such an agreement in the
Emrick case because the parents had entered into it without the
assistance of the court. Twenty-four years later, the court used
the mere existence of the agreement in Emrick to distinguish
Blue from that case in order to support its retreat from tacitly
approving the superior court's willingness to compel noncus-
todial parents to pay for post-secondary expenses.84  Penn-
sylvania practitioners will soon discover the extent of the
disadvantage Curtis places on both the custodial parent and the
79. See Samuel B. Fineman, Separated Parents Not Obligated For College; Act 62
Struck Down, LEGAL INTELLIG., Oct. 12, 1995, at 1.
80. Blue v. Blue, 616 A.2d 628, 632 (Pa. 1995).
81. Blue, 616 A.2d. at 632. The court stated that it would "await guidance" from
the legislature instead of affirming the duty that the superior court had enunciated. Id.
82. Curtis v. Mine, 666 A.2d 265, 268 n.3, 270 (Pa. 1995). The court had even
noted that it began its review with a presumption of constitutionality. Id. The court then
proceeded to cast aside both the presumption and Act 62's clear statement that the legis-
lature believed it was acting rationally and legitimately. Id.
83. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 271 (Montemuro, J., dissenting). E.g. Wallerstein &
Corbin, Father Child Relationships After Divorce: Child Support and Educational Oppor-
tunity, 20 FAm. L.Q. 109 (1986).
84. Blue, 616 A.2d at 631. This limited reading appears to be in conflict with the
court's statement in Emrick approving a lower court rule allowing court-ordered post-
secondary support where a noncustodial parent's income and assets allow that parent to
contribute without "undue hardship." Emrick v. Emrick, 284 A.2d 682, 683 (Pa. 1971).
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student by requiring them to negotiate for an express agreement.
These clients will surely ponder the rationality of a decision that
forces them to expend precious bargaining power to secure what
Act 62 would have allowed a court to compel: payment from the
noncustodial parent for post-secondary educational expenses.
David Gould
